It barely makes sense, though? The idea is that it will surface insider information to the public. That happens only because the insider is financially incentivized to place a bet. But they will only bet if they can win money, and they can only win money if someone is taking the other side of their bet, which necessarily means someone without their insider information.
In other words, prediction markets require suckers to lose money to insiders in order for the public to learn new information. In this case, people lost over a million dollars to an insider so the public could learn that "d4vd" was searched a lot.
People with insider information often aren't necessarily aware they even have it. "Superforecasters" are often just "good at predicting" moves within a given vertical, because they have expertise and exposure to the trends of that vertical, and are good at making deductions and extrapolating trends. Those people make money from prediction markets just as often as people with true insider info do.
And the people they're both making money from, are people who think they have enough expertise + exposure to function as superforecasters — and who probably could function as superforecasters, in a market with fewer "sharks" in the pool — but who lose out simply because they were slightly less well-calibrated than whoever they were trading with.
Which is to say: prediction markets can still work and be worthwhile to participate in, even if everyone in them is rational. They don't require suckers.
But, in practice, they certainly do seem to attract them.
> And the people they're both making money from, are people who think they have enough expertise + exposure to function as superforecasters — and who probably could function as superforecasters, in a market with fewer "sharks" in the pool — but who lose out simply because they were slightly less well-calibrated than whoever they were trading with.
This seems like a complicated way to say "suckers". Of course they don't usually self-identify as such and think they act rationally.
They're not suckers; they can win, if there's nobody who happens to be more-well-calibrated than them on a particular bet. And that can happen more-often-than not, depending on how carefully they bet.
By the conventional use of the term, a "sucker" is always a sucker; suckers suck constitutionally.
But a professional gambler in a skill-based game (e.g. poker), is only going to lose money on net, if they happen to be playing against people with "higher ELO" than them.
And in the case of a prediction market, the "ELO" isn't absolute; people's expertise "rankings" are relative to each particular question. There's no "general factor of expertise" that makes someone able to beat the odds on every question. Each question forms its own market "niche", where only people with expertise will be interested in participating; and so each such niche is to some degree illiquid, with not enough trades to make an efficient market (i.e. the kind you wouldn't expect to find a $20 bill on the ground in.)
To be more concrete: while there are "specialists" (insiders, but also ordinary experts in hyper-specialized verticals) who might clean up by betting on the things they know a lot about, they'll generally be miscalibrated as overconfident on the things outside their specialty (see: any scientist who got famous for their research and now writes pop-science books about topics they know very little about, often making incorrect statements), and so will lose out vs "generalists" who can't successfully make the in-domain bets the specialists make, but who are better-calibrated on multiple topics (or on particular odd intersections of topics) because they spend less time hyperfocused on one niche, and more time flitting between various niches.
Which is to say: there's no "house edge" here to lose against. In a prediction market, everyone's going to be the "shark" for some questions and the "sucker" for other questions. Every question is its own game, and every game has an edge, but with that edge going to a different party. If you actually know what you know, then you can identify which questions you have the edge for (probably a finite number), answer only those, and make some (very small) amount of money. You may lose sometimes because someone knew even better than you (esp. for questions that go beyond yes-or-no, where there are 3+ mutually-exclusive prediction-categories you can buy into, such that others might "hit the bullseye" while you just "hit the ring"); but on average, if you stick to your "field of pre-eminent expertise" (presuming you have such), you would make a small positive gain over time.
That being said, anyone without a "field of pre-eminent expertise", who thinks they can place correct bets purely by being rational + doing the level of research one can accomplish using public Internet sources, is 100% a sucker, yes.
I think some may be using the terms "insider" and "shark" in different ways. To me:
* Insider: A person who is cheating because they actually know the answer in advance or have direct, non-public, confidential information which materially improves their odds over even domain experts. If caught, they can go to jail. Insider as in "insider trading" not just an "industry insider".
* Superforecaster: A person who has deep domain expertise and/or experience as well as strong research and estimation skills which increase their odds over a naive bettor. This may include historical data or first-hand investigation which is not commonly or easily available to others but has not been obtained illegally.
* Sucker: A person who bets despite having far less than a superforecaster's expertise, experience or knowledge. Probably over-estimates their knowledge while underestimating the degree of relevant knowledge which may be legally obtainable by others.
* Shark: Not really clear to me other than more skilled/knowledgeable than a sucker.
The other side could be someone with natural exposure to the question that wants to hedge, for example people traveling to/from the middle east were exposed to the Iran war question(s) and could get insurance against airspace closure through prediction markets.
This argument doesn't work for 90+% of the volume on PM/Kalshi but I think most of the questions there are just gambling.
Disclaimer: I have not read any literature on the economics of prediction markets, and I know nothing about the mechanics of Polymarket/Kalshi.
I would imagine that in theory, everyone thinks they have the best information at the time, something like:
House: "Odds that X happens? We'll put $1 on both sides to get it started. 50/50."
Someone comes along: "Oh dang, I'm definitely more than 50% confident that X is happening. Let me put $1 in." Now it's 67:33.
Someone else comes along: "Oh I'm more than 67% confident X is happening, let me put $1 in." Now it's 75:25.
And of course, you get people going: "I'm more than 25% confident that X is _not_ happening, let me put $1 in!" And now it's 60:40.
The murky part, I would imagine, comes when the odds and the payout actually act as something that influences the outcome, but in perfect theory-land, if everything goes as planned, this should move the odds to the most informationally-accurate measurement, which should, in theory, benefit observers by making this measurement public.
Sure but these things are not really "odds" anymore, right? The most searched terms might be a mystery to the general public, but not to the engineers at Google. It gets even murkier when you can influence the outcome. The exact temperature at an airport might be difficult to predict, but if you are able to hold up a hair drier to the sensor for a few minutes you can be pretty sure it won't be cold.
When the other side either has information that makes it not a bet, or if they have means to influence the odds, the best outcome for outsiders is to not play at all.
And of course, the entire conceit relies on the idea that more accurate information to the public is always good and always outweighs the negative externalities. But is it really all that important to the public good what the most searched artist is on Google in a certain year? Or if an announcer will say a certain word during the super bowl?
I don't think this is entirely true. Polymarket is extremely transparent on user accounts and markets so you can see who is betting what, their other bets, and so on. The article mentions that other users fingered him for insider trading. That itself opens up an opportunity for profit, by simply following the trades on what he seems to be an insider on. It'd be like if you could see in real time what Nancy Pelosi was investing it - shadow her trades and make big bucks with the soon to be announced market shifting government deal/regulation/etc.
The markets also open up the door for hedging, arbitration and other sorts of opportunities where you don't necessarily even care what the result is.
Right, and that is not some grand secret. Every person taking a side on the bet is aware of that nuance for any trivially gamed market. If you think the size of the market is sufficient to incentivize somebody to do so then that would obviously increase the yes odds.
It's akin to betting on penny stocks in the market where you are also aware that a single person could dramatically shift the market one way or the other if they wanted so you're betting not just on the stock's performance, but also on the meta-market.
it is good if the losers are voluntarily participating. They are not coerced (stupidity is not coercion) into it, and therefore, it is reasonable that they expected to win the bet.
The only problem i have with polymarket (and others like it) are that insiders can often remain anonymous. It should not, and if an insider earns, but their win requires they remain anonymous or face some social/reputational repercussions, then that should happen.
Therefore, as long as KYC is enforced for these markets, i would have zero issues with their existence.
In most modern societies, we regulate all sorts of things that people would otherwise willingly do to their own detriment. We ban drugs; we have labor laws; we have usury laws; we require seatbelts; we have securities regulations; etc. (Notably, until very recently, this included most forms of gambling.)
So the mere fact that losers are voluntary does not, IMO, make the situation good.
all of those things you mentioned have damages sustained on third parties that did not have consent. And tbh, my opinion is that the banning of drugs have done more harm than not banning it (but instead, allow it to be sold safely and cheaply).
Gambling to me, is like that. Banning it doesn't stop it, and it has barely any harm other than to the person who over-indulge. Regulating it is a good idea - where regulating means there's oversight on cheating, on the platform's governance etc.
> all of those things you mentioned have damages sustained on third parties that did not have consent.
The family that suddenly finds themselves homeless because one parent decided to go deep into debt to fuel their gambling addiction sure seems to have "damages sustained on third parties that did not have consent."
Gambling addiction has impacts beyond the person gambling, because we live in a society. They might gamble away their kid's college fund, lose their house, or resort to stealing money from family members. When they take out loans that they default on, it impacts the balls and raises costs for everyone else.
All of these are very similar to secondary and societal effects of hard drug addiction. It should at the very least be regulated. And most being is worthless from an information standpoint, so isn't providing any societal upside - a man doesn't hurt us. The world was strictly better before we had rampant gambling everywhere.
Imagine bad (incorrect and potentially harmful) information is public knowledge. Examples are "X cures cancer" or "Is Y dangerous to consume".
A prediction market will be seeded by public knowledge (of course it cures cancer or its safe to consume), which you describe "suckers". History is filled with many examples of bad public knowledge that turned out to be false (e.g. DDT is safe pesticide).
An insider (someone who knows the drug trial results, or works at the Corp creating the harmful substance) is incentivized to trade on that knowledge, which creates a better informed public (via people who pay attention to prediction markets).
Why does secret(insider) knowledge exist? To the benefit of the organization that wants to keep the knowledge secret. Insider trading laws purpose is to keep Corp and gov orgs in power. They prevent the dissemination of true information (for private power). Prediction markets incentivize the dissemination of true information, a public good.
That is the beauty of the Resolution part of prediction markets. If evil DDT Corp bets money to skew the market, then they lose even more money on the Resolution (assuming the resolution is deterministic of harm and has not been manipulated).
Oh good, the entire premise of the value of the system rests on an axiom with such giant and obvious flaws that you could drive a supertanker through it.
Does the resolution use the scientific paper that says "DDT is safe" or the one that says "DDT is unsafe"? There's no objective resolution of scientific facts.
"Prediction markets provide better information" in the exact same way that "Markets are efficient". You need to interrogate what "Better information"/"efficient" actually means even if you take the claim at face value, and also it's just not a model that maps to reality well.
The public didn’t even learn the most searched term from the market. The public had a better idea it might be “d4vd” from the market, but only slightly before they learned it for real from Google.
What I can’t figure out is why this person is being charged but the companies running the bets are not.
In other words, prediction markets require suckers to lose money to insiders in order for the public to learn new information. In this case, people lost over a million dollars to an insider so the public could learn that "d4vd" was searched a lot.
Is this good?