If I understand correctly, I see all your points as potential rewards.
These rewards are useful to the US if they accomplish regime change to a friendly regime or at least military occupation of a good strip of land.
The article is about how these two preconditions for obtaining the rewards are unlikely to be fulfilled and, at the same time, non-accomplishment might achieve the opposite:
- Iran (and by necessity, other Gulf states if they want to export oil) align more with China
- US-partnership will not provide security (Arab states, South Korea and other allies are now less secure and the US can't protect them)
- US and allies are in a worse position to secure South America
Huge risk with little chances of a reward. That's the article.
Modifying the rewards does not change the game unless the probability of obtaining them increases or that of the risks decreases.
These rewards are useful to the US if they accomplish regime change to a friendly regime or at least military occupation of a good strip of land.
The article is about how these two preconditions for obtaining the rewards are unlikely to be fulfilled and, at the same time, non-accomplishment might achieve the opposite:
- Iran (and by necessity, other Gulf states if they want to export oil) align more with China
- US-partnership will not provide security (Arab states, South Korea and other allies are now less secure and the US can't protect them)
- US and allies are in a worse position to secure South America
Huge risk with little chances of a reward. That's the article.
Modifying the rewards does not change the game unless the probability of obtaining them increases or that of the risks decreases.