> I don’t anyone claiming it was not possible to diagnose
I read many times that it was impossible to diagnose it as runaway stabilizer trim.
> training for things was bad
Stabilizer trim runaway is trained for. Pulling back the throttles for overspeed warning is trained for.
> that the crews that experienced crashes had fewer safety features than typical western crews
How would you explain not being able to handle runaway stabilizer trim, and ignoring overspeed warnings? How do you explain the Emergency Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash, that reiterated what I'm writing here, yet the EA pilots either never received it, never read it, or forgot about it?
> Clack clacking sounds are not sufficient
737 captains tell me it is. The wheels are also painted black & white so their movement is easily seen, as it's right there next to the pilot. How much more obvious do you require it to be?
> Assuming that pilots would just turn off the system is not sufficient.
Turning off misbehaving systems is the bulk of emergency procedure training.
> seems zany to me
It would seem zany to anyone who knows only about the popular media narrative.
I've also gotten emails from pilots who told me I had it exactly right.
As for myself, I worked on the 757 stabilizer trim gearbox design. At one point, I knew about everything there was to know about it. The 757 system is not identical to the 737 one, but the method of dealing with runaway trim is the same - turn the mofo off. It's why there's a switch prominently placed right there on the center console. Do you want to believe that pilots don't know what the switches on the center console are for? Do you want to fly with a captain who doesn't know what they're for? There's no excuse for a captain to not know what all the controls are for.
P.S. Why would a 737 captain open up and tell me the truth? I let them know who I am, and back it up with details of how it works that an investigative journalist would never know. Then they're happy to chat with me.
> 737 captains tell me it is. The wheels are also painted black & white so their movement is easily seen, as it's right there next to the pilot. How much more obvious do you require it to be?
I’m imagining Boeing putting you to talk to the press and you insisting it was the pilots fault because the plane was making a clacky clacky sound.
I think you sound like a lunatic.
I also recall a key issue was that Boeing tried to make minor changes to the plain such that new training was not required
It's striking to see an argument from authority, against the dominant narrative, deployed in service of dismissing those who purportedly aspire to "rewrite history to fit a narrative".
The way the press reported on it was just despicable.
P.S. in case it isn't clear, I am not a pilot myself, but friends and family are pilots. One just got his Apache Chopper certification! Wow! Me so proud and so envious.
Honestly, anyone who has domain knowledge about something the press reports on, and doesn't realize that the press is just doing whatever they want and fitting the relevant facts to that, is probably not paying attention much at all.
It's also pretty obvious that the "officially accepted story" around the 737 is better for everyone including Boeing - because it's now been wrapped up and completed; there was a bug, the bug is fixed, the end.
The real story that there are some unknown number of pilots flying planes right now that will not deal correctly with emergency situations - that's a much harder problem, and much scarier to face.
But it's obviously real; any number of air disasters occurred because the pilots didn't follow the basic emergency procedures.
None of that means that the cases where they have to shouldn't be reduced, mind you.
I read many times that it was impossible to diagnose it as runaway stabilizer trim.
> training for things was bad
Stabilizer trim runaway is trained for. Pulling back the throttles for overspeed warning is trained for.
> that the crews that experienced crashes had fewer safety features than typical western crews
How would you explain not being able to handle runaway stabilizer trim, and ignoring overspeed warnings? How do you explain the Emergency Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash, that reiterated what I'm writing here, yet the EA pilots either never received it, never read it, or forgot about it?
> Clack clacking sounds are not sufficient
737 captains tell me it is. The wheels are also painted black & white so their movement is easily seen, as it's right there next to the pilot. How much more obvious do you require it to be?
> Assuming that pilots would just turn off the system is not sufficient.
Turning off misbehaving systems is the bulk of emergency procedure training.
> seems zany to me
It would seem zany to anyone who knows only about the popular media narrative.
I've also gotten emails from pilots who told me I had it exactly right.
As for myself, I worked on the 757 stabilizer trim gearbox design. At one point, I knew about everything there was to know about it. The 757 system is not identical to the 737 one, but the method of dealing with runaway trim is the same - turn the mofo off. It's why there's a switch prominently placed right there on the center console. Do you want to believe that pilots don't know what the switches on the center console are for? Do you want to fly with a captain who doesn't know what they're for? There's no excuse for a captain to not know what all the controls are for.
P.S. Why would a 737 captain open up and tell me the truth? I let them know who I am, and back it up with details of how it works that an investigative journalist would never know. Then they're happy to chat with me.