>This doesn't make any sense. It's easier for a distant foreign power to project power than a neighboring country? And the distant nation would be more willing than the neighbor?
Turkey had very high, even overwhelming military involvement in politics. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO.
As a result, in the case of such a war the US would have been able to force a coup, or at the very least cause a split in the military. Indeed, the US had a very high degree of control over Turkey during the cold war, and it had really cemented US alignment in the actual power structures.
>Both Soviet submarines and aircraft carriers were usually allowed through, the symbols of post war naval power.
Soviet aircraft carriers had to be seriously gimped in order to be classified as "heavy missile cruisers" and allowed passage.
>Your entire point seems to be that the US placed a much higher value on Turkey than Egypt already. I find that hard to accept given how they sided with Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis but were immediately willing to sell out Turkey during the Cuban Missile crisis. Either way, I'd still describe the treatment they received "similar" as my original post claimed.
The US did not sell out Turkey during the CMC. Indeed, the ICBMs that the US had recently developped made the missiles in Turkey no longer useful, and they weren't under Turkish command to begin with.
>. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO.
This doesn't make it easier for them to project power there, they invested more into projecting power there. It's still far easier for a bordering state, and if Turkey had ever hinted at altering the strait agreement the USSR likely would have spent more projecting power there.
Really, I have no idea what your point is anymore. Nothing you've said has suggested that Turkey, Syria, and Iraq would have been occupied for the past century if they had a canal. I only brought up NATO to demonstrate that the countries already held strategic importance.
Turkey had very high, even overwhelming military involvement in politics. The US had incredibly high involvement in the Turkish military as a result of NATO.
As a result, in the case of such a war the US would have been able to force a coup, or at the very least cause a split in the military. Indeed, the US had a very high degree of control over Turkey during the cold war, and it had really cemented US alignment in the actual power structures.
>Both Soviet submarines and aircraft carriers were usually allowed through, the symbols of post war naval power.
Soviet aircraft carriers had to be seriously gimped in order to be classified as "heavy missile cruisers" and allowed passage.
>Your entire point seems to be that the US placed a much higher value on Turkey than Egypt already. I find that hard to accept given how they sided with Egypt during the Suez Canal crisis but were immediately willing to sell out Turkey during the Cuban Missile crisis. Either way, I'd still describe the treatment they received "similar" as my original post claimed.
The US did not sell out Turkey during the CMC. Indeed, the ICBMs that the US had recently developped made the missiles in Turkey no longer useful, and they weren't under Turkish command to begin with.